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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Clayton Adams appeals following the district court’s denial of his motion for credit
for time served. Mr. Adams asserts that the district court erred when it denied his
motion requesting credit for time served on his aggravated battery sentence. When
Mr. Adams was sentenced in 2007, the conviction for aggravated battery was ordered to
be served consecutively to the conviction for second degree murder, but the sentence
for second degree murder was subsequently vacated by the district court as part of
Mr. Adams’ post-conviction relief. When the sentence was vacated, the consecutive
nature of his sentences ended as there was no sentence to which the aggravated
battery could be consecutive.

At Mr. Adams’ re-sentencing on the second degree

murder charge in 2014, the district court did not specify whether the new second degree
murder sentence was consecutive to, or concurrent to, the aggravated battery charge.
Thus, the sentences are concurrent and Mr. Adams is owed credit for time served for
the aggravated battery conviction.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In 2007, Mr. Adams was charged by Information with the following crimes: 1)
one count of first degree murder committed in the course of a felony, or alternatively,
through premeditation; 2) one count of aggravated battery; and 3) three counts of
attempted robbery.

(R.34220, pp.27-31.)1

The case proceeded to a jury trial.

This Court took judicial notice of the transcripts and record from Mr. Adams’ appeal in
S.C. Docket No. 34220 and augmented the record on appeal to include the Clerk’s
Record, Reporter’s Transcripts and Exhibits filed in prior appeal No. 42667. For ease of
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(R.34220, pp.112-156.) The jury ultimately acquitted Mr. Adams of all three counts of
attempted robbery, acquitted him of the murder in the first degree charge under both
theories, found him guilty of the lesser charge of second degree murder, and found him
guilty of aggravated battery. (R.34220, pp.157-161.)
On May 8, 2007, the district court sentenced Mr. Adams to life, with twenty-five
years fixed, for the second degree murder and to ten years, with three years fixed, for
the aggravated battery. (5/8/07 Tr., p.112, L.24 – p.113, L.13; R.34220, pp.172-173.)
The aggravated battery charge was ordered to be served consecutive to the second
degree murder charge, for an aggregate sentence of life, with twenty-eight years fixed.
(5/8/07 Tr., p.113, Ls.7-13; R.34220, pp.172-173.) The district court entered a written
judgment of conviction which provided that Mr. Adams’ sentences on each count “to run
consecutively.” (R., p.34; R.34220, pp.172-173.)
In 2010, Mr. Adams filed a post-conviction petition.

(R.42920,2 pp.12-1473,

1641-1694.) The district court partially granted Mr. Adam’s petition for post-conviction
relief, finding Mr. Adams had been misinformed as to the possible penalties for second
degree murder. (R.42920, pp.1894-1895 (incorporating the oral findings of fact and
conclusions of law made during hearing on 6/23/14 Tr.); R. 42667, pp.34-36, 45-47,
116-117.) The district court’s summary dismissal and re-sentencing orders vacated
Mr. Adams’ sentence on the second degree murder, and the district court set a resentencing hearing. (R.42920, pp.1894-1895, 1908-1909, 1933; 6/23/14 Tr., p.82, L.23
reference, the record in each underlying appeal will be cited herein as “(R.34220, p.)” or
“(R.42667, p.).” (R., p.75.)
2 Mr. Adams filed a motion asking this Court to take judicial notice of its file in the appeal
in his post-conviction case, Adams v. State, S.C. Docket No. 42920. References herein
to documents in the Clerk’s Record shall be to “(R.42920, p.).”
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– p.84, L.6; p.87, Ls.8-24.)

On October 15, 2014, the district court re-sentenced

Mr. Adams on the second degree murder to life, with twenty-five years fixed. (10/15/14
Tr. p.99, Ls.1-5.) At the re-sentencing, the district court was silent on whether the
sentence was to be served concurrent with the aggravated battery sentence or
consecutive to the aggravated battery sentence. (10/15/14 Tr.) The written Amended
Judgment of Conviction on the second degree murder did not specify concurrent or
consecutive service of the sentence, but provided, “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the
sentence previously imposed on May 8, 2007, with regards to the charge of Aggravated
Battery in Count II, and as set forth in the Judgment and Commitment filed May 15,
2007, shall remain as reflected in said judgment.”

(R., p.32.)

Mr. Adams timely

appealed and asserted on appeal that his sentence was excessive. (R.42667, pp.131134.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence in an unpublished opinion,
State v. Adams, 2015 WL 4740372 (Ct. App. 2015).
On November 2, 2015, Mr. Adams filed a Motion for Credit for Time Served and
a supporting memorandum in which he asserted that he should receive credit for all of
the time served on both of the two counts for which he was convicted. (R., pp.25-65.)
Mr. Adams asserted that when he was re-sentenced on the second degree murder
conviction, the district court did not make the sentence consecutive thus it was
concurrent and he was entitled to credit for the time he spent in custody. (R., pp.25-65.)
Alternatively, Mr. Adams asked that the Judgment be corrected pursuant to I.C.R. 36,
as a clerical error. (R., p.25.)
The district court denied Mr. Adams’ motion without a hearing. (R., pp.66-67.)
The district court denied Mr. Adams’ motion, seeking “to void or correct his sentence for
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Aggravated Battery.” (R., p.66.) The district court held that because Mr. Adams was
never granted post-conviction relief consisting of a re-sentencing on the charge of
Aggravated Battery, there was no merit to his reliance on State v. Drier, 139 Idaho 246
(Ct. App. 2003). Mr. Adams filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s order
denying his motion. (R., pp.68-69.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Adams’ motion for credit for time served?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Adams’ Motion For Credit For Time Served
A.

Introduction
Mr. Adams asserts that the district court erred when it denied his request for

credit for time served. Although Mr. Adams’ sentence on the conviction for aggravated
battery was initially ordered to run consecutively to the conviction for second degree
murder when he was sentenced in 2007, the first sentence for second degree murder
was vacated, thus the consecutive nature of his sentences vanished where there was
no sentence to which the aggravated battery could be consecutive.

Upon his

resentencing in 2014, the district court did not specify that the second degree murder
was consecutive to the aggravated battery, thus, the sentences are concurrent.
Mr. Adams respectfully requests that this Court remand the case with an order for the
district court to issue a corrected Amended Judgment of Conviction which clarifies that
the sentences are to be served concurrently and which gives Mr. Adams the requisite
credit for time served on the aggravated battery.
B.

Standard Of Review
A determination as to “[w]hether the district court properly applied the law

governing credit for time served is a question of law over which” appellate courts
exercise free review. State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006). On appeal,
the appellate court will “defer to the district court’s findings of fact, however, unless
those findings are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record
and are therefore clearly erroneous.” Id.
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C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Adams’ Motion For Credit For Time
Served
In 2007, Mr. Adams’ sentence on the conviction for aggravated battery was

ordered to be served consecutively to the conviction for second degree murder. (5/8/07
Tr., p.112, L.24 – p.113, L.13.) In 2013, the first sentence for second degree murder
was vacated by the district court’s summary dismissal and re-sentencing orders as part
of Mr. Adams’ petition for post-conviction relief (R.42920, pp.1894-1895, 1908-1909,
1933), whereupon the consecutive nature of his sentences vanished as there was no
sentence to which the aggravated battery could be consecutive. When Mr. Adams was
re-sentenced for the second degree murder charge in 2014, the district court did not
specify whether the new second degree murder sentence was consecutive to, or
concurrent to, the aggravated battery charge. (10/15/14 Tr., p.99, Ls.1-7.)

Because

the second degree murder sentence was imposed after the aggravated battery
sentence, the only way the sentences could be consecutive is if the district court said so
during its oral pronouncement at the re-sentencing. However, while the district court did
attempt to incorporate the aggravated battery sentence into the 2014 written Amended
Judgment of Conviction (R.42667, p.130; R., p.32), this was ineffective for the reasons
discussed below. Because the aggravated battery charge had ceased to be consecutive
once the second degree murder was vacated, and because such an incorporation was
contrary to the oral pronouncement of sentence, the sentences are concurrent and
Mr. Adams is owed credit for time served for the aggravated battery conviction.
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1.

The Consecutive Nature Of The Aggravated Battery Ceased Once The
Second Degree Murder Sentence Was Vacated For Re-Sentencing

In 2007, the district court first imposed the sentence for second degree murder
and then sentenced Mr. Adams on the aggravated battery conviction.

(5/8/07

Tr., p.112, L.24 – p.113, L.13; R., pp.33-34.) The district court ordered the aggravated
battery sentence be served consecutively to the second degree murder sentence.
(5/8/07 Tr., p.112, L.24 – p.113, L.13; R.42667, p.62.) The sentence for second degree
murder was subsequently vacated by the district court’s orders after Mr. Adams
prevailed on two of his post-conviction claims. (R.42920, pp.1894-1895, 1908-1909,
1933.) When the first sentence, the one that the aggravated battery sentence was
consecutive to, vanished, so did the consecutive nature of the aggravated battery
sentence. A consecutive sentence must be tied to, or consecutive to, another sentence.
Similar to the facts of State v. Teal, 105 Idaho 501, 505 (Ct. App. 1983),
Mr. Adams’ Amended Judgment of Conviction incorporated the aggravated battery
sentence from the original Judgment of Conviction, and, like the Teal Court, this Court
should find that phrases within a Judgment dictating a legally impossibility are
surplusage and should be stricken to avoid confusion. As the Teal Court found:
Thus, once one sentence had been imposed, the court was free to exercise
its discretion by ordering the second sentence to be served consecutive to
the first. Here, however, the district court, in the original judgment and
sentence in each case, made each sentence consecutive to the other. As
noted at the outset of this opinion, the forgery sentence (Docket No. 1024)
was the first pronounced. At that point, there was no other sentence to which
the term “consecutive” could apply. Therefore, the phrase “said five (5) year
term is to run consecutively with the sentence in Minidoka County Case No.
1026” is surplusage and should be stricken to avoid confusion.
Teal, 105 Idaho at 505.
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A period of incarceration cannot be ordered consecutive to a sentence that had
not yet been pronounced, or had been pronounced but vacated, or even pronounced
but reversed.

In Blitz v. United States, 153 U.S. 308, 317-18 (1894), a term of

imprisonment under a judgment on the third count of an indictment was stipulated to
commence upon the expiration of the judgment on the first count, and the judgment on
the first count was reversed because of error. The United States Supreme Court held
that the term of imprisonment on the third count should commence on the date
imprisonment to begin on the first count. Blitz, 153 U.S. at 317-18; see also Kite v.
Com., 52 Mass. 581, 585 (Mass. 1846) (holding that a consecutive sentence is legal;
and “[i]f the previous sentence is shortened by a reversal of the judgment, or a pardon,
it then expires; and then, by its terms, the [subsequent] sentence in question takes
effect, as if the previous one had expired by lapse of time.”)
The sentence on the second degree murder was vacated. When it was vacated
for re-sentencing, the second sentence for aggravated battery became the only
sentence. It could thusly not be served consecutive to any other sentence, for no other
sentence existed.
2.

Upon Mr. Adams’ Re-Sentencing, The Second Degree Murder Sentence
Was Concurrent To The Aggravated Battery Sentence

Mr. Adams’ second degree murder sentence is concurrent with the aggravated
battery sentence where, at re-sentencing, the district court did not specify whether the
second degree murder sentence was to be served concurrently with or consecutive to
any other sentence, thus, the second degree murder sentence could only be
concurrent.
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Idaho case law holds that if the trial court does not specify whether a sentence is
to be served concurrently or consecutive to another sentence, the sentence will be
concurrent. State v. Bosier, 149 Idaho 664 (Ct. App. 2010).
In State v. Allen, 144 Idaho 875 (Ct. App. 2007), the Idaho Court of Appeals held:
Under Idaho law, “the only legally cognizable sentence in a criminal case
is the ‘actual oral pronouncement in the presence of the defendant.’ The
legal sentence consists of the words pronounced in open court by the
judge, not the words appearing in the written order of commitment.”
Id. 144 Idaho at 877-878 (internal citations omitted) (holding that, where the sentence in
the amended judgment did not comport with the sentence pronounced at the sentencing
hearing, the oral pronouncement controlled and the district court’s contrary intent did
not).
The subsequent Amended Judgment and Commitment provided “that the
sentence previously imposed on May 6, 2007, with regards to the charge of Aggravated
Battery in Count II, and as set forth in the Judgment and Commitment filed May 15,
2007, shall remain as reflected in said judgment.” (R., p.32.) However, the district
court’s attempt to integrate the previously imposed sentence was ineffective for two
reasons:

(1) the oral pronouncement controls, thus, any attempt to modify the

sentences by correcting or altering the sentences in a written order was invalid; and (2)
in order to have the sentences be consecutive, the district court was required to make
the later-imposed sentence (the second degree murder) consecutive to the sentence
imposed first (the aggravated battery) once the sentence was orally pronounced on the
defendant.
In State v. Searcy, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the oral pronouncement
of a corrected sentence did not prevail over a subsequent written recitation of the
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sentence that was consistent with the original sentence. 124 Idaho 107, 112 (Ct. App.
1993). However, in Searcy the hearing was held to correct a defect in the sentencing
by rescinding one of the two sentencing enhancements, not to sentence the defendant
anew. Id. Thus, it is distinguishable from the facts of Mr. Adams’ case, where the
district court vacated the sentence on the second degree murder charge, and then
sentenced Mr. Adams anew.

That is, once the second degree murder charge was

vacated, the aggravated battery was consecutive to nothing. It was therefore no longer
a consecutive sentence, it was concurrent. His resentencing in 2014 could not alter the
nature of the aggravated battery sentence.
Where the district court did not specify that the second degree murder was
consecutive to the aggravated battery the oral pronouncement controls, and the
sentences are concurrent.
3.

Mr. Adams Is Entitled To Credit For Time Served On The Aggravated
Battery Since His 2007 Sentencing

When the aggravated battery sentence that was initially ordered to be served
consecutive to the second degree murder sentence became concurrent, the aggravated
battery sentence became wholly concurrent from the date the sentence was imposed in
2007.

Thus, credit is owed to Mr. Adams’ aggravated battery sentence from

approximately 2007 to present because a sentence cannot be partly consecutive and
partly concurrent.
“A sentence is either consecutive to or concurrent with another sentence, but
never both. A singular sentence simply cannot be partially concurrent and partially
consecutive to another sentence.” Mickelsen v. Idaho State Corr. Inst., 131 Idaho 352,
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355 (Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis in original) (holding that district court’s modification of
defendant’s sentences from being served consecutively to concurrently applied
retroactively to date sentences were imposed, and thus, defendant was entitled to have
credit for time served applied to sentences as though they were concurrent when
originally imposed).
In Mickelsen, the district court modified the defendant’s sentences from
consecutive to concurrent; however, the Idaho Department of Correction failed to alter
its credit for time served calculation to reflect the district court’s modification.
Mickelsen v. Idaho State Corr. Inst., 131 Idaho 352 (Ct. App. 1998). The Idaho Court of
Appeals held that the Department had to treat Mickelsen's sentences as though they
were imposed concurrently ab initio, i.e. as of May 30, 1991, and the time Mickelsen
served in prison had to be credited to both offenses. Id. at 356. The Court reversed
and remanded the case for recomputation of Mickelsen’s credit for time served dating
back to his original judgment of conviction.
Here, the facts show that Mr. Adams’ sentences are concurrent, and that he is
entitled to additional credit for time served on each count for which he received a
sentence; thus, the district court erred when it denied his request for credit for time
served. The supporting documentation submitted by Mr. Adams show he is entitled to
nearly nine years of credit for time served on the aggravated battery charge. (R., p. 30.)
This Court should hold that Mr. Adams is entitled to have his sentences treated as
though they were imposed concurrently ab initio, i.e. as of May 8, 2007, and the time
Mr. Adams has served in prison must be credited to both offenses. Mickelsen, 131
Idaho at 356.
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Mr. Adams respectfully requests that this Court remand the case with an order
for the district court to issue a corrected Amended Judgment of Conviction which
clarifies that the sentences are concurrent and which gives Mr. Adams the
corresponding credit for time served on the aggravated battery, approximately 3,333
days, or nine years and one month from the May 8, 2007 sentencing hearing to the date
of this Appellant’s Brief.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Adams respectfully requests that this Court order the Amended Judgment be
corrected and that he be given credit against each sentence for all time he spent in
custody.
DATED this 22nd day of June, 2016.

___________/s/______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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